China’s International Political Interests

QUESTION

QUESTION 1: CONTRAST China’s international political interests, capabilities, and actions with Russia’s. Drawing on the assigned readings, how closely aligned do you believe the two states to be? How is their relationship likely to evolve in the next five to ten years?
Support and defend your answer using specific examples from the course materials.
Required length 850-words.
Here are some helpful hints:
• Write your conclusion first, then write your introduction
• Write the body of your paper next.
• Make sure you use a minimum of seven different sources. Use the author-date-page system.
o For materials provided in the course (i.e., materials listed in the course’s Resource List): Use author-date-page format.
o For example: During the turbulent 1960s, science fiction programs on television reflected the public’s attitudes toward the older generation (Hodges 2003, 176).
o Hodges (2003, 176) discussed how, during the turbulent 1960s, science fiction programs on television reflected the public’s attitudes toward the older generation.
o In a 2003 article, Hodges (176) discussed how, during the turbulent 1960s, science fiction programs on television reflected the public’s attitudes toward the older generation.
• While well documented facts are important, what you think and how you defend your position is most important. There is a delicate balance here: do not give me a history lesson and very little personal thought. By the same token do not give just your personal opinion. Ideally, I would like to see about 40% facts with 60% your personal opinion (critical thinking).
• Make sure you re-read your work. Spell check does not catch run on sentences or the difference between real words with different meanings: “in-depth knowledge” and “inept knowledge”
• DO NOT USE WIKIPEDIA AS A SOURCE

Notes To Be Used

The focus on states as key actors in the international system dovetails with the perspectives of both realism and liberalism. In either case, policymakers must assess the role of other states in their own calculations about national security.

First, the United States faces security challenges emanating from major states, such as China and Russia, who seek to increase their power relative to the United States and other contenders. These states’ actions may cause instability within their respective regions of influence and destabilize neighboring states. Recent examples include Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and Russian intervention within Eastern Ukraine. China is increasingly asserting itself in the East and South China Seas against neighboring states to protect rich resources and trade opportunities.

Second, the United States is concerned with threats posed by adversary states that are known, or believed, to be pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, such as North Korea and Iran. While these states may pose security challenges in and of themselves, they also have the potential to contribute to larger problems of regional instability, such as conflict on the Korean Peninsula or Iranian actions with regard to Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. As another example, while the United States has cooperative relations with Pakistan in fighting terrorism, many remain concerned about the domestic instability of this nuclear-armed country and its uneasy relationship with India — yet another nuclear-weapons state.

Third, weak and failing states continue to pose real challenges for U.S. security, in addition to creating humanitarian concerns. Issues may arise because of the common phenomenon of refugees migrating away from conflict, often crossing into neighboring states and fueling regional instability. There is perhaps no better example of this today than with the Syrian crisis and its destabilizing effects on Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey. Additionally, weak government institutions in both Pakistan and Afghanistan pose problems for stability in southwest Asia, besides providing havens for extremist groups (as does Syrian instability). Finally, the weakness of many governments in various regions in Sub-Saharan Africa not only adds to regional instability but also increases the chance that pandemics may spread globally, as the recent Ebola outbreak demonstrates.

In 2015, Russia released its own NSS, supporting domestic health and education and promising renewed interest in Central Asia and Sino-Russian relations. It targeted three elements:

A new, more favorable international balance of power
Broader access to new markets for funding and exports
Actively exerting influence in the former Soviet region

How Russia aims to do this:

Get other major powers to respect Russia’s interests, by developing a ‘polycentric’ international order with Russia as an equal of the U.S., China, and the EU. They also seek to diminish the international reach and impact of Western institutions, both political and economic, so that those institutions operate under much more uncertain conditions.
Access export markets for its oil and gas reserves, as well as for weapons system sales. This, combined with getting economic sanctions, will better prepare them for (d) below.
Project regional authority and power to shape foreign policies of neighboring states and ‘protect’ Russian citizens living abroad.
Use the funds garnered in (b) above to continue to pay off powerful elites within Russia, keeping loyalty to Putin very high.

Like Russia, China has been assertive diplomatically, economically, and even militarily in what it views as its rightful area of dominance, and this includes the East and South China Seas. Perhaps the first obvious instance of this was the U.S. Navy incident with China in April 2001, where an EP-3 collided with a Chinese fighter, causing the Chinese pilot’s death and the detention of the EP-3 and its crew on Hainan Island for over a week. In December 2013, the USS Cowpens cruiser barely avoided a collision with a Chinese Navy ship that seemed to clearly target the U.S. Navy ship for being too close to Chinese vessels, although the U.S. ship was in international waters in the South China Sea. According to Chinese maritime expert Peter Dutton, in “China’s Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas,” China has used a policy of “non-militarized coercion, which involves the direct and indirect application of a broad range of national capabilities to alter the situation at sea in China’s favor” since 2008 (2014, p. 11). In addition to the United States, Chinese activities have also targeted close U.S. allies in the region such as Japan.

From a realist perspective, it makes sense that the major state in a region would attempt to dominate that area and nearby states to enhance its security. Even from the perspective of liberalism, it is not remarkable that a major state like China would attempt to enhance its economic and trade relations with nearby states to enhance its wealth (and security). Recall that expanded trade relations are considered to be beneficial for all states and to contribute to peaceful relations between states. And, from the constructivist perspective, the fact that the Chinese people are interested in asserting their identity and culture within their geographic region is not surprising.

ANSWER

China’s International Political Interests, Capabilities, and Actions: A Comparison with Russia

China is currently known for its assertiveness and response to international relations, especially conflicts. With the deteriorating ties between Russia and the U.S., China’s position in the event leads to the questioning of its alignment with regard to political interests, capabilities, and actions. While most of the interests, capabilities, and actions align, Russia comes off as rogue, while China is a peer.

First, China is majorly focused on the power play and the economic benefits that come with it. For instance, China claims sovereignty over the South China Sea, which is facing disputes from more than one country. Although it was ruled that the claim had no legal basis, as Zhao (2020) writes, China insists on bilateral negotiation as opposed to arbitration and other multilateral processes to reach an agreement on territorial disputes. On the other hand, Russia is using power play.[1] through its global power on oil and gas reserves, ultimately leading to a worldwide political standstill. Refusing to settle a score with Ukraine, Russia aims to acquire self-sufficiency, which closely relates to how China is handling its land disputes. Therefore, power play in both countries is similar except for the difference in the use of force being witnessed in Russia’s military action against Ukraine.

Secondly, China aims at global economic domination by shaping an international order as opposed to Russia’s not-so-peer tendency. According to Dobbins, Shatz, and Wyne (2018), China is similar to Russia in the aspect of seeking to alter the status quo. However, China has not attacked its neighbors like Russia nor has it annexed conquered territories[2]. China as a force has also been neutral by not supporting insurgent forces that seek to detach and assassinate its opponents. It, however, cannot be assumed that China does not have the capability to do so; the state aims to be at the top by using technology and economic strides, unlike Russia, which interferes in foreign political activities like elections and subverting foreign democracies as it is supporting the Assad regime in Syria.[3]. Dobbins, Shatz, and Wyne (2018) support that China’s influence is growing because of its investment, global development, and trade assistance. Otherwise, it has been helpful in peacekeeping operations by the United Nations, making the state a lesser threat than Russia and a long-term force to challenge.

Thirdly, there is no doubt that China and Russia have the most outstanding military capabilities through weaponry and the military. The two states constantly compete to reassert their influence beyond their borders. They are now fielding their military capabilities, which are said to be designed to deny access to countries like the U.S.U.S. when in crisis. According to Dobbins, Shatz, and Wyne (2018), these Chinese and Russian capabilities are a form of contesting the existing geopolitical advantages of the U.S.U.S. to their favor. Nevertheless, the two states are known to be multilateral challenges for the U.S. as they combine their efforts to limit the US. [4]

Although China and Russia continue to progress in different dynamics, the future is uncertain as the revolution continues. Unlike what is known about the future of China, some studies refute that the state might not be the same in the future. For instance, Fingar and Jean (2020) say;

“China is likely to be less prosperous and less powerful than predicted by the predominant narrative.”[5]

This particular aspect creates uncertainty on how the relationship between China and Russia is and how it will be in the future. According to Fingar and Jean (2020), no assessment or comprehensive framework has been able to link or prove military cooperation between China and Russia. At the same time, China’s response to other countries’ actions towards Russia following the recent attack has created controversy regarding the presence of military and strategic cooperation. In this regard, the strategic and military alliance assumed to be existing between China and Russia is somewhat limited and unmethodical.[6]. Still, all analyses on the China-Russia partnership have proved to be inconclusive and deemed to lack consensus on why the assumed partnership has developed (or will develop), what it means, and what the degree of firmness will be.

In conclusion, the future relationship between China and Russia is unclear. Referring to the international relations literature does not solve this unclarity because terms like alliances, partnerships, and alignment are not of help in this relationship. It is difficult to name the current relationship and even the future because of the trajectory name’ China is seeking to maintain and grow. In other terms, China wants to maintain strategic relationships with the global community as it aims to expand its trade and peace relations.[7]. Therefore, the definitive relationship that links China to Russia is only based on its military capabilities[8], domestic actions, and some interests that do not necessarily mean cooperation. Basing further argument from the realist point of view[9] which recognizes the significance of economic and trade relations and the pursuit of power and security, China’s alignment with Russia is not a viable option for the state.

References

Akin, Andy. What do we Know about Russia’s ‘Grand Strategy?’ The Washington Post. 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/05/02/what-do-we-know-about-russias-grand-strategy/

Dobbins, James, Howard J. Shatz, and Ali Wyne. Russia Is a Rogue, Not a Peer; China Is a Peer, Not a Rogue: Different Challenges, Different Responses. RAND ARROYO CENTER SANTA MONICA CA SANTA MONICA, 2018.

Fingar, Thomas & Jean C. Oi. China’s Challenges: Now It Gets Much Harder, The Washington Quarterly, 43:1, (2020): 67-84, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2020.1734304

GREENE, SAMUEL A. “Protest in Russia: Discovering Power.” Russian Politics Today (2022): 431.

Kliman, Daniel. “China’s Power Play: The Role of Congress in Addressing the Belt and Road’.” Center for a New American Security 12 (2019).

Korolev, Alexander. “How Closely Aligned are China and Russia? Measuring Strategic Cooperation in I.RI.R.” International Politics 57, no. 5 (2020): 760-789. Doi.org/10.1353/apr.2018.0018

Ruonan, Liu, and Liu Feng. “Contending Ideas on China’s Non-Alliance Strategy.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 10, No. 2 (2017): 151-171.

Tangredi, Sam J. “Anti-Access Strategies in the Pacific: The United States and China.” The U.S.U.S. Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 49, no. 1 (2019): 3.

Zhao, Suisheng. East Asian Disorder. Asian Survey, 60, No. 3, (2020): 490–509

[1] GREENE, “Protest in Russia: Discovering Power.” 431

[2] Dobbins, Shatz, and Wyne, Russia Is a Rogue, Not a Peer; China Is a Peer Not a Rogue: Different Challenges, Different Responses, 2

[3] Akin, 2017. “What do we know about Russia’s ‘Grand Strategy?’”

[4] Dobbins, Shatz, and Wyne, 2018. Russia Is a Rogue, Not a Peer; China Is a Peer, Not a Rogue, 6.

[5] Fingar & Jean, 2020. “China’s Challenges: Now It Gets Much Harder”

[6] Fingar, & Jean C. Oi (2020) China’s Challenges: Now It Gets Much Harder. 70

[7] Kliman, “China’s Power Play: The Role of Congress in Addressing the Belt and Road’.” 2019

[8] Tangredi, (2019). “Anti-Access Strategies in the Pacific: The United States and China.”

[9] Korolev & Portyakov, (2018). China-Russia relations in times of crisis: A neoclassical realist explanation. 411-437.